Andrew Sullivan put up some important bullet points about the Kay report. Oddly, they only seem to come from the first third of the report, and many of the interesting bits come in the second two thirds. Here is my incomplete list:
- Extensive work was done with harmless strains of plants and bacteria which is directly applicable to the dangerous strains. For example, "...one scientist confirmed that the production line for [Bacillus Thurengiensis] could be switched to produce anthrax in one week if the seed stock were available."
- Iraq tended not to label their chemical weapons, and kept them together with conventional weapons.
- There are 130 known Ammunition Storage Points, many of which exceed 50 square miles, and only about 10 of these have been examined. About 92% of Iraqi ASPs have not been searched.
- Progress is slow to document human testing of biological warfare agents because the people who know are afraid of being tried for crimes against humanity.
- It was estimated that in 2001-2002, it would take about 6 months to start up the dormant mustard gas program and have weapons using it. (In 2002, Uday was told 2 months to mustard and 2 years to sarin.)
- Iraq would have been willing to use sub-standard disposable equipment for CW manufacture, instead of corrosion-resistant equipment. This means that the Iraqi CW program will not be distinguishable from harmless chemical programs based on tank equipment.
- "Saddam Husayn remained firmly committed to acquiring nuclear weapons."
- While there is no evidence that the nuclear weapons program was yet restarted, Iraq retained technology capability at the 1991 level and engaged in dual-use technology research.
- Iraq was committed to delivery systems improvements in dramatic breach of UN restrictions.
- Iraq reinitiated work on converting SA-2 Surface-to-Air Missiles into ballistic missiles in early 2003, despite the presence of UNMOVIC.
- Iraq was working on developing land-attack cruise missiles (by adapting sea-attack cruise missiles and extending their range).
- Iraq's liquid ballistic missile propellant infrastructure was being developed by a group of foreign experts from abroad (under a $10 million 18 month contract which was later extended).
- "[T]here is little doubt from the evidence already gathered that there was substantial illegal procurement for all aspects of the missile programs."
And all of this being said, here is the most important part. Using Mr Sullivan's phrase, the money quote:
Saddam, at least as judged by those scientists and other insiders who worked in his military-industrial programs, had not given up his aspirations and intentions to continue to acquire weapons of mass destruction. Even those senior officials we have interviewed who claim no direct knowledge of any on-going prohibited activities readily acknowledge that Saddam intended to resume these programs whenever the external restrictions were removed.
To put it more bluntly: If Saddam was not forcibly stopped, it was only a matter of time until he developed an extensive arsenal of weapons of mass destruction.
It's an interesting report, and well worth reading the whole thing. It's not very long, as government reports go, and quite informative.